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a b s t r a c t
We extend previous research to demonstrate that risk-averse firms can appear to be
risk-seeking when facing multiple sources of risky cash flow. While our model requires
that cash flows from operations are independently, uniformly distributed, we are able to
demonstrate that three previous derived results hold with multiple sources of risk. Using
chance constrained programming, we demonstrate that binding probability constraints
can cause (1) a higher degree of aversion to illiquidity to induce increased risk taking;
(2) apparent risk-seeking behavior; and (3) an increase in endowment to lead to lower
expected profit.
© 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
The expected utility hypothesis has been criticized for failure to explain many observed behaviors, including apparent
risk-seeking behavior of decisionmakers. Friedman and Savage [1], Kahneman and Tversky [2] and Golbe [3], among others,
have argued that decision makers’ behavior is not always consistent with a concave utility function, i.e., risk-aversion. In
some cases, decision makers appear to be risk-seeking over losses and risk-averse over gains. DeVuyst, Garosi and Wu
(DGW) [4] recently demonstrated that a cash flow threshold can force risk-averse decisionmakers to engage in risk-seeking
behavior. Their model shows that, if the probability of satisfying cash flow demands is below a decision maker’s minimally-
acceptable probability, risk-seeking is essentially imposed on the decision maker. Their model was, however, limited to one
risky and one riskless production alternative. Under an assumption of complete capital markets, the decision maker can
always obtain a riskless asset or portfolio of assets. However, when this assumption is relaxed as in DGW, the firm cannot
always generate sufficient cash to control an optimal level of a riskless asset. So, it is an open question as to if their results
can hold with multiple risky assets.
Relaxing the assumption of complete capital markets also leads to the possibility of binding cash flow constraints. In the
event of tight operating profits and incomplete capital markets, the firmmight not be able to obtain sufficient credit to fund
operations and meet other cash flow obligations, namely debt repayment. Hakansson [5], Golbe [3], Mahul [6], Audia and
Greve [7] and DWG [4] consider the prospect of cash flow deficits on firm behavior.
Here we revisit the problem first presented by DGW except that we allow for two risky assets. While it is
necessary to impose more restrictive assumptions on the distributions of returns from the risky assets, we are able
to demonstrate the possibility of apparent risk-seeking behavior by risk-averse decision makers with multiple risky
assets.
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1. Model
Following DGW, we assume that a risk-averse decision maker faces uncertain cash flow net of operations. That is,
production generates cash flow above variable costs that is used to meet fixed cash flow demands, namely principal
payments on debt. Failure tomeet these cash flow demands results in business failure. Because of randomness in production
output andmarket prices, cash flow generated by production is random. Thus, a cash flow constraint has uncertainty on the
left-hand-side. DGW used chance constrained programming [8] to incorporate this constraint uncertainty. They establish
the concept of illiquidity aversion with this modeling approach. Using this approach, the probability of satisfying cash flow
demands must equal or exceed a liquidity preference parameter (β in DGW notation).
Under these conditions, DGWwere able to establish three theorems regarding firm behavior. First, ‘‘. . . in the presence of
binding cash flow constraints, a higher degree of illiquidity aversion increases asset allocation to risky production alternatives
(Theorem 1)’’. Second, ‘‘In the presence of binding cash flow constraints, firms appear to exhibit risk-seeking behavior
(Theorem 2)’’. And third, ‘‘In the presence of binding cash flow constraints, expected profits may be declining in the resource
endowment (Theorem 3)’’. Each of their proofs, while relying on minimal parametric assumptions, is not readily adapted to
multiple risky production alternatives.
To account for the possibility of multiple risky production alternatives, we assume that production alternatives are
independently, uniformly distributed. We demonstrate that the three theorems from DGW apply to two uniformly
distributed assets. Thus, we show that apparent risk-seeking behavior can be caused by a cash flow threshold with multiple
risky assets.
Paraphrasing from DGW,3 we assume a decision maker has expected utility given as EU[W0(A¯)+ π˜ ]whereW0 is initial
wealth as a function of a resource endowment A¯ and uncertain net income π˜ . The fixed input A¯ is allocated between a
low-risk output L and a high-risk output H as A¯ = AL + AH . Denote AL and AH as the quantities of A allocated to L and H ,
respectively, with AL and AH infinitely divisible and AL ≥ 0; AH ≥ 0. (This is where our model begins to extend DGW. In
their model, L is a riskless production alternative.) Returns to fixed costs from each unit of AL and AH are given as π˜L and π˜H
with means µL and µH , respectively. The lower bound of the distribution of π˜H is assumed to be less than the lower bound
of π˜L, otherwise H can first-order dominate L. Profit is defined as π˜ = ALπ˜L + AH π˜H − f where f are fixed costs. Fixed costs
are non-cash expenses, such as depreciation. Output is implicitly defined as F(L,H, z, A¯) = 0 where z, a vector of variable
inputs, cannot substitute for A in the production of L and H .
We assume a decision maker faces the problem described in DGW except that both production alternatives are risky.
More precisely, we consider the following management problem:
max
AH
EU[W0(A¯)+ (A¯− AH)π˜L + AH π˜H − f ] (1)
s.t. Prob(CF − w ≥ 0) ≥ β (2)
wherew represents non-expense cash flows, including principal repayment obligations.
Cash flow, CF , is a random variable representing the cash flow from operations, namelyCF = (A¯− AH)π˜L + AH π˜H .
And the constraint (2) can be rewritten as
1− cdf CF (0)− β ≥ 0,
where cdf CF (0) denotes the cumulative density function of CF − w evaluated at 0.
We apply the method of Lagrangian multipliers to this maximization problem. There are three possible outcomes to this
problem. First, the constraint is non-binding and the problem degenerates to the well-known asset allocation under risk
problem. Second, the constraint is binding. And third, no solution can be found. As with DGW, our interest is on the case of
binding cash flow constraints. Since the constraint is binding, we need only find a solution to
1− cdf CF (0)− β = 0. (3)
To solve this equation for AH , we first rewrite this equation in terms of the probability density functions of π˜L and π˜H .
Lemma 1. Assume that π˜L and π˜H are independent random variables with probability density functions fπ˜L and fπ˜H . Then (3) can
be re-expressed as
cdf CF (0) = 1− β (4)
where
cdf CF (0) =
 ∞
−∞
 w−(A¯−AH )v
AH
−∞
fπ˜H (u)fπ˜L(v) du dv. (5)
3 Our notation and many assumptions, except where noted, come from DeVuyst et al. [4].
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Proof. The probability density function of CF can be computed explicitly. Since (A¯ − AH) π˜L and AH π˜H have probability
density functions
1
A¯− AH
fπ˜L

x
A¯− AH

and
1
AH
fπ˜H

x
AH

,
Respectively, cash flow CF as a sum of (A¯− AH) π˜L and AH π˜H , has the probability density function
fCF (x) =
 ∞
−∞
1
A¯− AH
fπ˜L

x− y
A¯− AH

1
AH
fπ˜H

y
AH

dy. (6)
Consequently (3) can be written as
cdf CF (0) =
 w
−∞
fCF (x) dx = 1− β, (7)
or,  w
−∞
 ∞
−∞
1
AH
fπ˜H

x− y
AH

1
A¯− AH
fπ˜L

y
A¯− AH

dy dx = 1− β. (8)
By making the substitutions x = AHz and y = (A¯− AH)v, we have w
AH
−∞
 ∞
−∞
fπ˜H

z − A¯− AH
AH
v

fπ˜L(v) dv dz = 1− β. (9)
Changing the order of the integrals and letting u = z − A¯−AHAH v, we find ∞
−∞
 w−(A¯−AH )v
AH
−∞
fπ˜H (u)fπ˜L(v) du dv = 1− β. (10)
For 0 ≤ β ≤ 1, (1) constrained by (2) has a unique interior solution if (1) is concave and a boundary solution, which is
denoted as A∗H = A∗H(A¯, β). We now establish a few properties on the solution A∗H . 
Theorem 1. Assume that the expected return to the lower-risk output cannot meet cash flow needs, namely A¯E[π˜L] < w. Then,
in the presence of binding cash flow constraints, a higher degree of illiquidity risk aversion can increase asset allocation to high
risk production alternatives, or
β ′ ≥ β ⇒ A∗H(A¯, β ′) ≥ A∗H(A¯, β). (11)
Proof. Taking the complete derivative of (4) yields
∂cdf CF (0)
∂AH
dAH = −dβ or dAHdβ = −
1
dcdf CF (0)
dAH
.
Differentiate cdf CF (0)with respect to AH to get
dcdf CF (0)
dAH
=
 ∞
−∞
fπ˜H

w − (A¯− AH)v
AH

A¯v − w
A2H
fπ˜L(v) dv. (12)
In general, (12) cannot be signed since it is the difference of two integrals. However, we can demonstrate Theorem 1 by a
specific example.
Assume, π˜H is uniformly distributed on [a, b], namely
fπ˜H (u) =

1
b− a ,
0
if a ≤ u ≤ b;
otherwise.
Further assume fπ˜L is supported on [c, d]with c and d satisfying
w − AHb
AL
≤ c < d ≤ w − AHa
AL
.
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Or, equivalentlyw ≤ AHb+ ALc andw ≥ AHa+ ALd. Then,
dcdf CF (0)
dAH
=
 w−AH b
AL
w−AH a
AL
1
b− a
A¯v − w
A2H
fπ˜L(v) dv
= 1
(b− a)A2H
 d
c
(A¯v − w)fπ˜L(v)dv
= 1
(b− a)A2H

A¯
 d
c
vfπ˜L(v)dv − w

= 1
(b− a)A2H
[A¯E(π˜L)− w] < 0. (13)
So, dcdf CF (0)dAH < 0 and thus
dA∗H
dβ > 0. That is, A
∗
H = A∗H(A¯, β) is an increasing function of β and (11) holds. 
Theorem 2. Maintaining the assumptions of Theorem 1, in the presence of binding cash flow constraint, firms can appear to
exhibit risk-seeking behavior. Mathematically, σ 2′H > σ
2
H ⇒ A∗H | σ 2′H > A∗H | σ 2H .
Proof. Totally differentiate (4) with respect to AH and σ 2H :
∂cdf CF (0)
∂AH
dA∗H +
∂cdf CF (0)
∂σ 2H
dσ 2H = 0. (14)
Solving, we find
dA∗H
dσ 2H
= −
∂cdf CF (0)
∂σ 2H
∂cdf CF (0)
∂AH
. (15)
From (13), the denominator of (15) is negative under the assumptions of Theorem 2. For the uniform distribution, a simple
mathematical proof easily demonstrates that the numerator is weakly positive. So, the sign of (15) is weakly positive and
apparent risk-seeking behavior is confirmed. 
Theorem 3. In the presence of binding cash flow constraints, expected profits can be decreasing in endowments.
Proof. Assume A¯E[π˜L] < w. Expected profit is computed as E[π˜ ] = (A¯ − A∗H)E[π˜L] + A∗HE[π˜H ]. Differentiate with respect
to A¯:
dE[π˜ ]
dA¯
= E[π˜L] − ∂A
∗
H
∂ A¯
E[π˜L] + ∂A
∗
H
∂ A¯
E[π˜H ]
= E[π˜L] + (E[π˜H ] − E[π˜L]) ∂A
∗
H
∂ A¯
. (16)
As in DGW, it follows from the complete differentiation of (9) that
∂cdf CF (0)
∂AH
dA∗H +
∂cdf CF (0)
∂ A¯
dA¯ = 0.
Therefore,
dA∗H
dA¯
= −
∂cdf CF (0)
∂ A¯
∂cdf CF (0)
∂A∗H
.
Following a similar computation as in the proof of Theorem 2, ∂cdf CF (0)
∂ A¯
= − 1
(b−a)AH
 d
c vfπ˜L(v)dv = − 1(b−a)AH E(π˜L). By
assumption, the expected profit on the low risk alternative is positive, so ∂cdf CF (0)
∂ A¯
< 0. According to (13), dcdf CF (0)dAH < 0
and thus dA
∗
H
dA¯
< 0. So, (16) is indeterminate in sign. This implies that there are values of E[π˜L] and E[π˜H ] with expected
profit decreasing in the resource endowment. The intuition is that an increase in the endowment increases the probability
of satisfying cash flow demands, so the decision maker can decrease the allocation to the high-risk alternative. Since the
high-risk alternative has higher expected returns, the firm’s expected profits decline with the increased endowment. 
With Theorems 1–3, we have established more general versions of the DGW theorems, albeit with more assumptions
about the distributions of profits.
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2. Summary and conclusions
DGW [4] establish the possibility of apparent risk-seeking behavior by risk-averse decision makers. When faced with
a binding probabilistic cash flow constraint, decision makers may be forced to engage in risk-seeking behavior to satisfy
the chance constraint. The DGW model assumes one riskless and one risky production alternative. Here we extend their
results to includemultiple risky production alternatives. The results, which rely on parametric probability density functions,
confirm DGW’s three theorems: (1) under a binding cash flow chance constraint, an increase in illiquidity risk aversion
leads to risky production plans, (2) firms can appear to be risk seeking and (3) expected profits can decrease in endowment
levels. While the testable hypotheses derived do not rely on parametric distributions, these hypotheses cannot be signed
for themost general case. So, our derivations rely on a parametric form, specifically uniformly distributed random variables.
There are likely other parametric distributions that support our conclusions. We conducted a limited number of numerical
simulations to evaluate relaxing the independent uniform distributions assumption. These simulations results support our
conclusions.
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